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Abstract
Already before the ﬁnal introduction of the single European currency
there have been negotiations on a further enlargement of the Eurozone to
the East. The accession of 10 Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC) to Euroland is likely to be realised within the next 10 years and
it is an important issue to assess whether these candidates are better or
worse suitable for EMU membership than the current participants. The
theory of optimum currency areas provides several criteria and econometric
tools for analysing a prospective monetary union. Building on methodolo-
gies developed with regard to the current EMU we use a structural VAR
approach in order to identify economic shocks that hit the countries to be
analysed in the past. Correlations of the shocks disclosed do shed light on
the question whether a common monetary policy may be suitable for the
respective economies. The few already existing studies on this issue for the
region are all prone to the Lucas critique since they compare contempora-
neous correlations in East and West. In order to correct for this ﬂaw we
use lagged time series instead.
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1Criterion Inﬂation Interest FX rate Deﬁcit Debt
2001 10Y ¤ Deviation ¤¤ 2001 2001
Reference value 3.3 7.4 +/-15% -3.0 60.0
Bulgaria 7.9 5.2 -1.3 -0.9 72.5
Czech Rep. 4.7 5.6 -5.5 -3.2 29.0
Estonia 5.8 4.7 -1.2 1.1 6.2
Hungary 8.5 7.0 -4.4 -3.2 64.4
Latvia 2.5 10.7 2.6 -1.9 12.2
Lithuania 1.3 7.9 8.6 -1.4 29.0
Poland 5.6 8.3 -8.2 -4.0 38.0
Romania 34.5 34.9 -33.3 -3.7 31.2
Slovak Rep. 7.3 7.8 -1.8 -7.2 42.7
Slovenia 8.5 — -7.4 -1.3 25.4
Table 1: Maastricht convergence in CEEC
Source: Deutsche Bank Research (2002, p. 27)
¤ NA for some countries; approximated if necessary
¤¤ Maximum deviation from 3y mean within past 2 years
1 Introduction
The physical introduction of the Euro on January 1, 2002 has been a milestone
on the way to an economically integrated Europe. Already before this step, the
commission and governments of several Central and East European Countries
(CEEC) have started negotiations on an enlargement of EU to the East.1 For all
the accession countries the introduction of the Euro will be - on the contrary to
present members - a compulsory (Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999, p. 750).
The ﬁrst political accession wave is not to be expected before 2004 (Deutsche
Bank Research, 2002, p. 23). After having entered EU the respective countries
will have to join the EMS-II exchange rate system with horizontal ﬂuctuation
bands (Gulde et al., 2000, p. 3). Eventually, not before at least 2 years after EU
accession, the participating economies will be incorporated in the Eurozone. As
in the case of the already completed introduction of the Euro in the current EU,
a prerequisite for EMU accession will be compliance with the Maastricht criteria.
Table 1 shows data of the CEEC in comparison with the current threshold values
according to Maastricht. It is obvious that the debt, deﬁcit and exchange rate
1Currently there are negotiations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. While the negotiations
with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have started in 1998, the
others are in progress since 2000 (see Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999, pp. 746-47 and
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Figure 1: Nominal FX rates CEEC vs. DEM
Without Estonia; Source: IFS, own calculations (USD cross rates DEM per
currency CEEC)
volatility criteria are fulﬁlled by most of the applicants (complying values in ital-
ics). On the contrary, the inﬂation criterion is only met by Latvia and Lithuania.
Still, it is rather fair to state that the transition economies of the CEEC exhibit
signs of convergence according to Maastricht.
Nevertheless, a look at the historical exchange rates between the CEEC currencies
and DEM (see ﬁgure 1) shows some volatility. Although the movements in the
exchange rates have often been inﬂuenced by central bank policies it is still not
clear whether a ﬁxation of those rates by EMU accession is desirable or whether
a certain degree of ﬂexibility is necessary. With currency uniﬁcation the CEEC
will lose the possibility of revaluation against the Euro. This break can bring
along beneﬁts but also costs. The most prominent cost factor in this context is
the potential inability of the accession country to react to asymmetric shocks in
terms of output stabilisation.
3For answering the question of the suitability of countries for a single currency the
theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) oﬀers several assessment criteria. There
exist numerous analyses with regard to Western Europe while there are only few
studies on the CEEC (e.g. Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt, 1999 and Winschel,
2001) due to lack of reliable data and lots of structural breaks in the respective
time series (Masson, 1999, p. 12). This paper aims at analysing the suitability
of the CEEC for EMU accession with empirical methods of OCA theory while
considering the ﬂaws mentioned above.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief insight
into OCA theory. Section 3 presents empirical results for the CEEC building on
related work. Section 4 concludes.
2 A brief look at theory
The seminal papers on optimum currency areas were published in the sixties
of the past century under the era of Bretton Woods, which ﬁxed the exchange
rates of the major Western currencies. Accordingly, the respective authors com-
pared the implications of ﬁxed and ﬂoating rates without emphasising the link to
currency uniﬁcation. Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) who
formulated labour mobility, the degree of openness and diversiﬁcation as basic
assessment criteria for currency areas can be seen as founding fathers of OCA
theory.
Later on, due to the abolishment of Bretton Woods in the seventies, OCA the-
ory was merely absent in the academic discussion. Only in the eve of monetary
uniﬁcation in Western Europe at the beginning of the nineties, the theory ex-
perienced a renaissance. Positive and negative outcomes of potential monetary
union have been discussed in more detail. A comprehensive introduction to costs
and beneﬁts of currency uniﬁcation is given e.g. in De Grauwe (1997, pp. 5-84).
2.1 Costs of currency uniﬁcation
Costs may arise on the macro level because while relinquishing ﬂoating exchange
rates a country loses an instrument of reacting to upcoming disequilibria. As-
suming that exchange rates respond suﬃciently fast and exactly to fundamental
changes, the policy decisionmakers will lose an important instrument of stabili-
sation.
The most prominent cost factor that has already been emphasised by Mundell
(1961) and Kenen (1969) are shock asymmetries. Under the assumptions of price
and nominal wage rigidity and money illusion (cf. Boﬁnger, 1994, p. 7), a shift
in demand for products of a country B towards those of a country A will cause,
c.p., inﬂationary pressure in A as well as unemployment in B (Mundell, 1961).
Floating exchange rates might correct for these undesirable outcomes by devalu-
4ation of currency B. Under an arrangement with ﬁxed exchange rates, a central
bank dilemma evolves since there will be no monetary policy being optimal for
both countries at the same time. Thus, another adjustment mechanism such as
factor mobility is needed to prevent substantial macroeconomic costs (Mundell,
1961).
Although the assumptions of the Mundellian model are very restrictive, it is still
the base for a major line of empirical OCA research. The most prominent criti-
cism is that nominal wages being at least partly ﬂexible downwards can (partly)
substitute for the adjusting function of labour mobility (Masson and Taylor, 1993,
pp. 16-17). Perfectly ﬂexible nominal wages would in turn make labour mobility
unnecessary with regard to OCA assessment. Are, on the contrary, real wages
rigid downwards, the ﬂoating exchange rate will lose its function as means of
adjustment completely (Masson and Taylor, 1993, pp. 16-17 and Fenton and
Murray, 1992, pp. 512-13). Thus, a ﬁxation of exchange rates could from this
point of view not cause macroeconomic costs.
Accordingly, an analysis in line with the Mundellian model should always be ac-
companied by a closer look at wage rigidities (nominal as well as real) in order to
verify that other adjustment mechanisms than factor mobility are not available.
However, this is not state of the art in all of the related studies.
Another mechanism correcting for upcoming disequilibria may be ﬁscal redistri-
bution of funds from A to B (De Grauwe, 1997, pp. 9-10). If a currency union
does not include ﬁscal uniﬁcation and if the budget of the union is small in size,
this possibility will be strongly restricted. This aspect is closely connected to
shock asymmetry and gains importance when the participating economies are
mainly hit by asymmetric shocks rather than by symmetric ones. If neither wage
ﬂexibility, factor mobility, nor ﬁscal transfers can correct for shocks, giving up
ﬂoating exchange rates can bring along substantial costs.
Kenen (1969, p. 49) argues the degree of susceptibility of an economy to asym-
metric shocks to depend heavily on its degree of diversiﬁcation in production. A
broadly diversiﬁed economy would experience fewer changes in its terms of trade
than a highly specialised one since shocks hitting the country would aﬀect just
certain sectors of its economy. According to the law of large numbers, output,
unemployment and price level would - on the aggregate level - show a lower vari-
ability than on a sectoral level. Boﬁnger (1994, p. 8) notes ﬂexible exchange rates
to become more and more ineﬀective as means of adjustment when the degree of
diversiﬁcation is growing. Thus, a diversiﬁed economy will consider a currency
union being more advantageous than a specialised one.
Another potential cost factor concerns the public budget due to reduced seignor-
age. For a country with a history of high inﬂation joining currency union with
more price-stable economies may reduce revenues derived from printing money.
This is especially relevant for economies with an underdeveloped tax system that
5makes an ”inﬂation tax” desirable.2 The resulting reduction of revenues will -
under the assumption of no cuts in public spending - entail the need for higher
budget deﬁcits or for compensation paid by the union.
Costs may also be due to the Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect.3 Divergent growth rates
in the member states of a currency union may lead to persistent imbalances in na-
tional inﬂation rates. In the case of a monetary union of less and higher developed
countries, the formers will - due to trade liberalisation and foreign competitive
pressure - presumably experience higher inﬂation than the latters. It is assumed
that in such a situation productivity grows primarily in the sector of tradeables.
Resulting wage increases will nevertheless, due to reasons of competition, be
comparable in the non-tradeables sector as well (cf. Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001,
pp. 9-11). As the production of non-tradeables is not characterised by marginal
products growing in the course of time, the price level in this sector will increase.
For tradeables, the prices grow with a rate similar to the one abroad because of
international competition. Thus, the overall CPI increases faster in the formerly
poorer economies than in the other ones (Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect). Sell (2001,
p. 3) notes that currency uniﬁcation of countries with diﬀerent inﬂation rates
may be counterproductive as those with higher price level growth would tie up
liquidity which would force the central bank to push money growth in order to
avoid deﬂation in the higher developed countries.
2.2 Beneﬁts of currency uniﬁcation
Beneﬁts can be derived mainly on the micro level and are related to money prop-
erties. With the domain of a currency the extent to which the money fulﬁlls its
basic functions grows (Ishiyama, 1975, p. 362). According to Cohen (1998, pp.
218-219), a growth of the domain enhances the money function as means of ex-
change (due to reduced transaction costs), as a store of value (because of reduced
uncertainty) and as a measure of value (due to reduced information costs).
The introduction of a common currency reduces or even removes transaction
costs such as exchange fees. Furthermore, companies will face lower costs e.g. in
the ﬁeld of multi currency book keeping (Fenton and Murray, 1992, p. 489). In
addition, further positive eﬀects may stem from holding reduced foreign currency
reserves and from a lesser number of goods prices (Cohen, 1998, pp. 218-219).
Alesina and Barro (2000, pp. 5-12) show formally reduced transaction costs to
lead to higher output and consumption gains, thereby improving welfare.
Another important beneﬁt induced by integration of several countries into a sin-
gle currency area is the removal of exchange rate uncertainty (Tavlas, 1993, p.
668) which makes trade as well as foreign direct investment face less costs. If ex-
2For a detailed discussion see De Grauwe (1997, pp. 17-19) and Masson and Taylor (1993,
pp. 6-7).
3Cf. e.g. Eichengreen and Ghironi (2001, pp. 4-11) as well as Eikenberg and Zukowska-
Gagelmann (2001, p. 7).
6change rates are not always explainable by market fundamentals, a rate ﬁxation
may improve capital allocation and thus enhance economic eﬃciency (Fenton
and Murray, 1992, p. 490 and pp. 514-515). Furthermore, a currency union
can contribute to reduce speculative attacks against the participating currencies
(Bean, 1992, p. 32). Especially if the respective economies have already been
linked by ﬂuctuation bands4, speculative market forces may test the peg by trad-
ing comprehensive currency volumes. The involved central banks can try to keep
the FX rate within the ﬂuctuation margin by support transactions as long as
their reserves are large enough. If they are not, the market expectation will be a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
Additionally, monetary uniﬁcation reduces (under the assumption of imperfect
capital markets) the possibility that speculative market forces drive the currency
prices away from their fundamentally based value as the common central bank
will presumably dispose of higher reserves than a single one on its own (Fenton
and Murray, 1992, p. 500).
A relevant point in this context is also the concern that after currency uniﬁcation
the reduced volatility of the FX market could be transferred to other macro vari-
ables, such as monetary aggregates, instead. Flood and Rose (1993, pp. 20-21)
argue, employing an empirical analysis of diﬀerent currency pricing models, that
the decline in variability does not lead to higher variance in other relevant aggre-
gates. Thus, they provide evidence for the hypothesis that reduced uncertainty
in the currency market does not cause higher uncertainty in other markets.
Tavlas (1993, p. 680) emphasises that the eﬀect of ﬁxed exchange rates on bi-
lateral trade is not determined a priori (also see Fenton and Murray, 1992, pp.
490-91). Although the possibility that exchange rate variability inﬂuences trade
volume positively cannot be excluded theoretically (Eichengreen, 1993, pp. 1327-
28 gives some motivation for this view) a recent empirical study by Rose and van
Wincoop (2001) points to another connection. They estimate that intra-union-
trade within the present EMU could grow by more than 50% after the introduc-
tion of the Euro. This estimate does of course represent the eﬀect of all of the
factors mentioned above, but still the result supports the view that a possible
trade-reducing eﬀect of low exchange rate volatility was either not existent in the
sample analysed or overcompensated by other factors such as transaction costs.
Finally, removed uncertainty concerning future exchange rate movements reduces
risk premia issuers of bonds have to pay (Kopits, 1999, p. 4). In the medium
term this eﬀect may be favourable especially for public debt issuers as it could
reduce interest paid by the governments and lead to higher public investment or
potentially lower taxes.
Further beneﬁts of currency uniﬁcation may result from enhanced central bank
credibility (cf. Alesina and Barro, 2000, pp. 41-42 and Boﬁnger, 1994, pp. 20-22)
and from stronger market integration (Eichengreen and Frieden, 2000, pp. 11-12
4This is in the present context the case for e.g. Hungary.
7and Eichengreen, 1993, p. 1329). Besides economic reasoning, political consid-
erations may be taken into account additionally when deciding about currency
uniﬁcation (Karmann, 2001, pp. 445-446).
2.3 Are costs and beneﬁts relevant for an enlarged EMU?
Though in theory all of the costs and beneﬁts mentioned above are easily jus-
tiﬁable their importance for the prospective currency union has to be assessed
carefully before proceeding further. Building on the ﬁndings, one can then choose
an empirical method for analysing OCA suitability.
At the ﬁrst glance, shock asymmetries cannot be assessed and are, accordingly,
to be analysed in more detail. The other criteria, like seignorage and the Balassa-
Samualson-eﬀect, are rather less important in the context we focus on. Reduced
seignorage should not be a serious problem for the accession candidates after
having joined the club. Since all the aspirants have to meet the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria beforehand, potential conﬂicts between the deﬁcit and inﬂation
criteria would become obvious already before entering.
The impact of the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect on Euroland inﬂation is discussed in
several recent papers. Rogers (2001) estimates the inﬂuence of diﬀerent variables
on inﬂation rates in Europe and concludes that the Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect will
drive inﬂation in the CEE transition countries aspiring to join EMU considerably.
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001, p. 19) come to a similar conclusion and estimate
the potential yearly real appreciation due to the Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect in the
CEEC to be around 3.5%. Since nominal appreciation will not be applicable after
joining EMU, the price pressure will show up in a higher inﬂation rate. The inﬂu-
ence of the Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect on inﬂation rates in a larger Euroland will
nevertheless be presumably low. Sinn and Reutter (2000) estimate the minimum
inﬂation rate (the one being necessary to avoid deﬂation in the most price-stable
member country) to grow by only 0.19% after the joining of prospective EMU
members.5
Before having a closer look at shock asymmetries, the question for adjustment
mechanisms other than a ﬂexible exchange rate has to be answered. Possible
buﬀering channels may be labour mobility, wage ﬂexibility and ﬁscal policy.
Labour mobility will presumably not be available in an EMU containing the
CEEC as mechanism substituting for exchange rates (at least across present EMU
Eastern frontiers). Present members (especially Germany) demand a transition
period with mobility restrictions for the East (Deutsche Bank Research, 2001, pp.
24-25).6 Sell (2001, p. 8) adds that labour mobility - in order to serve as means
5The countries included in the analysis are Denmark, Greece, Sweden, Turkey, the UK and
the group of the ﬁrst CEEC.
6Besides these aspects, the decision of an individual to choose residence within Europe also
depends on factors such as cultural diﬀerences and language barriers (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs,
8of buﬀering shocks - should be symmetric, which cannot be assumed for EMU
and CEEC since welfare in EMU is higher than in the East. Thus, labour ﬂows
are expected to go primarily westwards. In line with these ideas, labour mobility
cannot - at least in the medium term - be expected to correct for asymmetric
shocks in an enlarged EMU. Accordingly, shocks should be symmetric. Still, we
will pursue this issue in more detail later on.
A second buﬀering mechanism that under certain preconditions can substitute
for the equilibrating function of exchange rates is wage ﬂexibility. If wages would
be rigid in real terms, as Fenton and Murray (1992, p. 513) suggest for the case
of Western Europe, ﬂoating exchange rates could not create any beneﬁt as buﬀer.
On the other hand, Eichengreen (1993, p. 1332) notes that real wages in West-
ern Europe could in fact be reduced by inﬂation - but the degree of elasticity
would be much lower than e.g. in the US. A recent study (Blanchﬂower, 2001,
pp. 8-15) analyses the interrelation between nominal wages and unemployment
using a microeconometric method for country speciﬁc wage curve estimates and
ﬁnds that unemployment rates inﬂuence nominal wages in CEEC negatively to a
degree being comparable to EMU. Though the study does not analyse real wage
ﬂexibility7, we can conclude that nominal wage ﬂexibility is comparable in East
and West. Furthermore, nominal ﬂexibility automatically implies real ﬂexibility.
Thus, to assure that CEEC are not less suitable for EMU than its present mem-
bers, shock asymmetry in the East must c.p. not exceed the one in the West.
The remaining instrument for buﬀering shocks in order to prevent or at least
reduce macroeconomic costs is a ﬁscal transfer. Krugman (1993, p. 260) em-
phasises that Europe lacks a ﬁscal system being comparable to the US-American
one and states that asymmetries comparable to the American ones will not be
manageable with the budget of the EU. A detailed discussion of this aspect is
provided by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) who highlight that country-speciﬁc
ﬁscal policy would be inferior in comparison with union-wide tax policy.8 A more
empirically oriented approach has been taken by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) who
estimate the fraction of shocks to GDP dampened by international transfers in
certain EU economies in comparison with the US. Their results support the view
that the capability of the EU of buﬀering shocks is much less developed than the
one of the US. Eichengreen (1998, pp. 12-13) collects results of diﬀerent related
studies and tends to the view that European countries should be able to man-
age dampening a similar shock fraction as the US federal states by automatic
stabilisers. Nevertheless he points out that the stability and growth pact may
restrict this option and may make the introduction of further transfer systems
1992, p. 197).
7A regression directly adressing real wages can be found in IMF (2000, pp. 160-61). Indeed,
it analyses the other direction, i.e. the inﬂuence of real wages on labour demand. Still, the
results point to a similar functioning of labour markets in EMU and CEEC (IMF, 2000, p.
161).
8For the detailed argumentation see Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992, pp. 198-199).
9necessary. Still, when enlarging EU, its ﬁscal structures will just be transferred
to the new members. So the quality of the union will neither be improved nor
worsened. The only critical case is the one of high shock asymmetries - but the
resulting problem then is due to exactly the asymmetries and independent of the
ﬁscal structure. Thus, the question to be answered here is not how the (existing)
EMU is to be assessed regarding ﬁscal structure but how to assess the Eastern
enlargement.
On the beneﬁt side, the arguments having been valid for establishing the present
EMU are theoretically also applicable to the Eastern enlargement. Transaction
costs are supposed to be reduced. Since the CEEC do already trade intensely
with EMU, this will be a major issue. Reduced uncertainty is a relevant point as
well. Enhanced central bank reputation can partly also be applicable as CEEC
with high past inﬂation will presumably experience monetary credibility gains
and in analogy to the situation in the West, it can be assumed that the prospec-
tive common currency will enhance market integration, too. In this paper we will
focus on the cost aspect of shock asymmetries in order to circumvent the prob-
lem of arbitrarily aggregating a number of diﬀerent qualitative and quantitative
assessments which would hardly be justiﬁable from a theoretical point of view.
3 Operationalising the theory
Several approaches for assessing OCA suitability of a prospective currency union
have been considered. Most of them belong to two major lines of research. They
either analyse past exchange rate movements or disclose economic shocks from
past data and evaluate their correlations.
Based upon seminal work by Vaubel (1976, 1978) one strand of research analyses
real exchange rate changes within the respective country group.9 Since real ex-
change rates function as a shock buﬀer by changing relative prices, countries with
volatile exchange rates are comparatively unsuitable for currency union. For ex-
ample, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997c) analyse exchange rate volatilities and
ﬁnd asymmetries in output time series having positive inﬂuence on currency mar-
ket pressure.
The compelling aspect of this method is that many cost criteria from OCA theory
are included at the same time.10 But there are some negative aspects, too. First,
the method uses ex-post data to conclude for the future and, second, there is
the Lucas critique that currency union and the need for exchange rate changes
are not independent of each other (Vaubel, 1976, pp. 440-41). Nevertheless, this
reasoning applies for all empirical methods so that it will not be discussed in
more detail.
9A simple approach can also be found in Poloz (1990).
10Factor mobility, degree of diversiﬁcation, ﬁscal integration and degree of openness are linked
to real exchange rate volatility. For a detailed explanation, see Vaubel (1976, pp. 437-38).
10Most importantly, one has to take into account that real variability is also inﬂu-
enced by nominal variability. The latter, in turn, can be controlled by speculative
pressure or diﬀerent central bank decisions in the respective countries (Vaubel,
1976, p. 459) so that OCA suitability estimates could be biased negatively.11
When analysing EMU and the CEEC accession candidates we face the fact that
EMU countries have been linked by EMS for years while the CEEC experienced
a variety of currency regimes. E.g. Lithuania had implemented a currency board
against the USD which may have lead to higher volatility with regard to the
Euro but does not tell anything about fundamental OCA criteria. Rose and
Engel (2001, pp. 11-16) analyse empirical properties of real exchange rates in
currency unions and ﬁnd that the standard deviation of exchange rate changes
can be explained by a highly signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient of a currency union
dummy while the adjustment speed is lower within a currency union. An inter-
pretation of these results may be that nominal exchange rates are obviously an
important means of adjustment. Still, total volatility of nominal rates and prices
is not completely transferred to prices when ﬁxing exchange rates. There are
either other mechanisms (e.g. through the labour market) or there is excessive
volatility in the exchange rates. The view that the latter is - at least partly - the
case, is supported by Flood and Rose (1993, pp. 20-21) empirically. Thus, an
exchange rate based analysis is likely to be misleading for our purposes.
An advanced exchange rate approach has been taken by Bayoumi and Eichen-
green (1997b) who use a panel regression to construct an OCA index yielding
a sorted order of the respective countries according to their OCA suitability.
For this purpose they regress nominal exchange rate variability on OCA-relevant
macro variables. This results in coeﬃcient estimates they use to forecast the
dependent country-speciﬁc variable which is then interpreted as an OCA index.
The OCA suitability of the respective country is considered the better the lower
the index is.
For their estimation, Bayoumi and Eichengreen use only industrial countries12.
The respective coeﬃcients are then applied to data of Western European EMU
candidates. Such an approach might entail econometric problems, too. The panel
analysis does not take into account that on the left hand side of the equation there
are limited dependent (censored) as well as uncensored variables since the nomi-
nal exchange rates between EMS countries were bounded by ﬂuctuation margins
in the sample considered and e.g. the USD rate was not.
11Unnecessary volatility due to uncoordinated monetary policy is removed when entering
monetary union. The same is valid for speculative movements. A comparison of ﬂoating (at
least within certain margins) exchange rates with an existing currency area may not be too
telling, accordingly. See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996, pp. 18-19), Boﬁnger (1994, pp.
13-14), Eichengreen (1992, pp. 141-43), Poloz (1990, p. 9).
12The panel includes data of the major European economies plus the USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand from 1983-92.
11Some papers13 transfer the Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) OCA index anal-
ysis to EMU accession candidates by applying the coeﬃcient estimates to macro
data of the Euro aspirants. This approach is questionable since it is not clear
whether the relation estimated for the Western world is comparatively stable in
the CEEC (cf. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997a, p. 186). So, the assumption of
a stable relationship without veriﬁcation might be too unrealistic in this case.
The second way to determine OCA properties of a group of economies is an
analysis of possible shock asymmetries among them employing output and price
data. For a certain economy, monetary independence is only necessary if it faces
asymmetric shocks with regard to its neighbours (Masson and Taylor, 1993, p.
17). If the economic shocks hitting potential members of a currency union are
merely synchronous, surrendering country speciﬁc monetary policy will not have
negative consequences. As expressed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996, p. 2):
”adjustment costs are a function of the symmetry of disturbances and the inter-
regional mobility of labor”.14
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) provide a comprehensive survey of relevant em-
pirical studies dealing with shock asymmetries.15 Studies taking this approach
for an analysis of the CEEC are Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999) and Winschel
(2001).
Further OCA approaches include labour mobility surveys16, cycle correlation
studies (Bini Smaghi and Vori, 1992, pp. 7-8 and Christodoulakis et al., 1995),
diversiﬁcation analyses (Bini Smaghi and Vori, 1992, pp. 9-13 and Bayoumi and
Prasad, 1995) or they study convergence amongst currency union aspirants.17
Finally, there are approaches trying to aggregate diﬀerent criteria (Schweickert,
2001 and Winschel, 2001).
As mentioned before, especially the cost potential due to possible shock asym-
metries should be studied carefully. An adequate method to do so is a structural
vectorautoregressive analysis which was ﬁrst used for OCA issues by Bayoumi
(1992) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
13E.g. Cincibuch and V´ avra (2000, pp. 8-9) as well as Eikenberg and Zukowska-Gagelmann
(2001, pp. 9-11).
14Also cf. Eichengreen and Frieden (2000, p. 13).
15See also Bayoumi (1992), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993), Chamie, Deserres and Lalonde (1994), Erkel-Rousse and M´ elitz (1995), Auria (1997)
and Bruneau and De Bandt (1999).
16For diﬀerent methodologies cf. e.g. De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991, pp. 7-9), Eichen-
green (1992, pp. 145-48), Bini Smaghi and Vori (1993, p. 15) and Winschel (2001, p. 16).
17Cf. e.g. Rangvid and Sørensen (2000, exchange rate analysis), Bayoumi and Taylor (1992,
SVAR model), Artis and Zhang (1995, business cycle convergence) and Angeloni and Dedola



















Figure 2: AS-AD diagram





























Figure 3: Demand shock in the AS-AD diagram
Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, p. 199)
3.1 Theoretical framework of shock analysis
Suppose the concerned economies can be characterised by a common AS-AD
model (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993, p. 200). The aggregate demand curve
has a negative slope coeﬃcient in the price-quantity-diagram while aggregate
supply has a positive slope in the short run and is vertical in the long run. This
model is shown in ﬁgure 2 with Y denoting the aggregate output and P the price
level.
In this model, a positive demand shock will result in a shift of the AD curve to
the right while the other curves remain unchanged. In the short run, the AS
and the AD curve will cross in a point characterised by a higher output and a
higher price level than before. In the long run, the AS curve turns vertical and
the equilibrium output sinks back to the original level. At the same time, the
price level grows further until the system reaches a new equilibrium with higher
prices and output unchanged (see ﬁgure 3).
A positive supply shock will on the contrary shift short and long run AS curves






























Figure 4: Supply shock in the AS-AD diagram
Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, p. 199)
prices will decline while output grows (see ﬁgure 4).
Summing up, in the standard AS-AD model supply shocks change prices and
quantities in the long run whereas demand shocks only inﬂuence prices while
they are not aﬀecting output in the long run. This property can be used to
distinguish between two shock types in the econometric approach. One should
notice that, accordingly, so far we can only distinguish between shocks inﬂuencing
output (shock type 1) and not aﬀecting output (shock type 2) in the long run.
Interpreting the two shock types to be identiﬁed below as supply and demand
innovations requires that the data meet all the assumptions of the model.
3.2 Isolation and evaluation of shocks
Assume that the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the logs of price level Pt and output Yt in the
economies to be analysed follow a stationary stochastic process18 of the form:
















which means that the changes of output ∆yt and prices ∆pt can be described by
an inﬁnite MA-process of independent exogenous shocks ²1t und ²2t:
18The procedure used in what follows is mainly taken from Chamie, Deserres and Lalonde
(1994).
14The respective reduced VAR form of the model is therefore:
∆xt = Π1∆xt¡1 + ::: + Πp∆xt¡p + ut (2)
where ut is the residual not explained by the regression in period t. The vector
ut is linked to the shock vector ²t by the coeﬃcient matrix A0:
ut = A0²t: (3)
The reduced AR representation can be estimated using OLS while the lag length
is to be determined with the help of information criteria.19 The regression yields









Under the above mentioned stationarity condition the estimated AR process can
be inverted into a Wold-representation (Hamilton, 1994, S. 108) as




The residuals estimated in the VAR are linear combinations of the underlying
structural innovations. In order to evaluate the relation between the exogenous
















Thus, an estimation of A0 allows the ˆ ²t to be derived directly from the ˆ ut. For
determining the estimated A0 four restrictions are needed. First, we normalise the
shock variances to unity and assume orthogonality of the diﬀerent shock types:
E(²t²
0
t) = I2: (8)




From (1), (3) and (5) we get furthermore :
A(1) = C(1)A0 (10)
19A detailed discussion of alternative criteria can be found in Luetkepohl (1993, p. 128 ﬀ.).
15where A(1) is the matrix of long run eﬀects of the structural shocks in (1) and
C(1) the long run coeﬃcient of the shocks in the reduced MA representation (5).
The theory described above implies the long run eﬀect of a demand shock on
output to be zero. In our context this means that the shock type 2 is neutral











The left hand side of this equation is completely known. Since A(1) is triangular
by assumption, A(1) can be derived by Cholesky decomposition of the left hand
side. Finally, (10) yields A0 which enables us to calculate the structural shocks
of type 1 and 2 from (3):
ˆ ²t = ˆ A0
¡1
ˆ ut:
The shocks having been isolated according to the procedure described above have
to be analysed according to OCA theory, in how far they occur symmetrically
in the respective countries. If countries are hit by the same shocks at the same
time, their suitability for currency union is better than if the shocks occur rather
asymmetrically. A simple approach of assessing the degree of shock symmetry
is therefore the calculation of the empirical correlation coeﬃcients. A further
method can be decomposing shocks into symmetric and asymmetric shares using
a state space model. In OCA analysis this method has been used to our knowledge
only by Chamie, Deserres and Lalonde (1994). Since modeling a Kalman ﬁlter
for the present context proved to be highly sensitive to iteration starting values
we decided to employ the simple correlation analysis.
3.3 Data
The data being necessary for the Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) approach in-
clude price and output time series. As proxy for total output we employ the
industrial production (IP) index.20 The respective data is available for all of
the countries to be analysed on a monthly basis. Present EMU is represented
in the sample by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Enlargement candidates we
consider are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
20This proxy has been used widely in the literature, e.g. by Bayoumi and Taylor (1992),
Angeloni and Dedola (1999) and Winschel (2001). Though this is not a perfect measure we
preferred this approach as it enables us to use data of high frequency.
16Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.21
The CPI time series we use (except for aggregate Euroland data) are taken from
IFS, the IP index data for the accession candidates has been provided by Deutsche
Bank Research. Aggregate Euroland data and IP series of the present EMU mem-
ber countries are taken from BLOOMBERG.
The sample comprises data from January 1990 to March 2001. Before proceed-
ing the analysis we have adjusted the time series by the multiplicative moving
average method, taken their logs and diﬀerenced them once.
A major ﬂaw of all previous analyses is that they use contemporaneous data and
are thus subject to the Lucas critique. Obviously, there are interrelations between
currency regime, cycle correlation and trade intensity. Artis and Zhang (1995)
ﬁnd that after the launch of EMS, cycle correlation of participating countries
with Germany increased while correlations with the US declined. This could be a
hint that structures are successively synchronised within the process of monetary
integration which would mean some kind of endogeneity of the OCA criteria.
A similar result is provided by Rose (2000, pp. 14-16) and Rose and Engel
(2001, p. 18) who analyse worldwide data samples and ﬁnd countries with a
common currency being cycle correlated slightly higher than economies with dif-
ferent means of payment. Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998) ﬁnd, furthermore,
that cycle correlation is positively inﬂuenced by trade intensity (Frankel and
Rose, 1998, pp. 1023-24) which implies that for countries a priori being no OCA
currency uniﬁcation might nevertheless entail positive net beneﬁts due to reduced
trade barriers such as transaction costs and uncertainty (Frankel and Rose, 1998,
p. 1012). Finally, Rose (2000) shows by evaluating the eﬀect of a common cur-
rency on bilateral trade that members of a single currency area are more closely
integrated than countries with an own currency.
Altogether, the studies mentioned point to joint endogeneity of the OCA crite-
ria trade intensity and cycle correlation. While the currency regime seems to
be interrelated to trade intensity and cycle correlation, cycle correlation itself is
obviously connected to trade intensity.
Endogeneities of OCA criteria reduce the power of a static suitability analysis.
As Habib (2001, p. 4) states: they ”contribute to confuse even more the already
complicated balance of costs and beneﬁts of a common currency”. Thus, when
analysing OCA properties of certain countries a critical aspect is the choice of
reference values. Using data of a single currency area which has already been
existent over a long period is not applicable according to the Lucas critique (see
Bayoumi and Prasad, 1995, pp. 4-5).
To circumvent the Lucas critique in this paper we do not compare OCA criteria in
CEEC and EMU contemporaneously but draw a comparison between the status
quo in the CEEC and the state of EMU in the mid of the nineties. Since gradual
transition processes into a single currency area may change shock correlations, we
21Estonia is excluded due to missing data.
17should account for such endogeneities in our analysis. An evaluation of contem-
poraneous data in EMU and the CEEC cannot - though this is the conventional
approach chosen in all of the quoted studies - shed much light on the question to
be answered and would presumably bias the results for the accession countries
unfavourably. Employing lagged time series we can conclude whether the tran-
sition economies are better or worse candidates for joining EMU nowadays than
EMU countries themselves had been just before the introduction of the Euro.
The sample used for Western Europe is 1990:1 to 1995:12, for Central and Eastern
Europe 1996:1 to 2001:1.22 An exception is Bulgaria where the ”outlier period”
in the price level series until 1997:2 due to high inﬂation has been removed from
the sample. The available IP series of Bulgaria does already end in 2000:2. The
beginning of the CEEC sample has been set to 1996, though for most of their
economies there are data available from 1993 on. Still, structural breaks due to
the transition from central planning to market economy may inﬂuence the quality
of the VAR negatively. So we decided to choose a shorter but later sample.
3.4 Econometric results
To employ the structural VAR method without error correction terms the data
used have to be stationary. Thus, we use the ADF test in order to check for unit
roots in the respective series.23 If there was a trend in the series, we ﬁtted a
linear function of time to the data and subtracted it from the original series.24
Furthermore, we normalised the series by subtracting their mean so that they
ﬂuctuate around zero. For all of the EMU time series the null hypothesis of a
unit root could be rejected at conventional conﬁdence levels. A noticeable feature
of EMU CPI series - with the exception of Germany - is a negative time trend in
the sample which may be interpreted as a sign of convergence towards lower in-
ﬂation rates. For all of the CEEC series, except for the Czech Republic CPI, the
null could also be rejected. Still, the power of the ADF test could be weakened
due to the short samples and possible structural breaks (Bruneau and De Bandt,
1999, p. 10 and Artis and Zhang, 1998, p. 128). Thus, we treat the Czech CPI
series nevertheless as stationary, but keep the ADF test result in mind.
For the estimation of structural shocks we employ the SVAR model described
above. The lag length is chosen as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, p. 207)
according to the Schwarz information criterion.25 The Schwarz criterion sug-
gested to use lag orders of 1 or 2. In order to remove residual autocorrelation a
22If longer time series were available, the additional data has been included in seasonal
adjustment but not in shock identiﬁcation.
23A detailed discussion of alternative unit root tests can be found in Banerjee et al. (1997,
pp. 99-135).
24See, e.g., Blanchard and Quah (1989, p. 661).
25The Schwarz criterion is consistent and indicates - in comparison with Akaike - a relatively
parsimonious lag order (Luetkepohl, 1993, p. 182).
18general lag order of 2 was chosen.
After estimating the innovations of the two categories we calculated the correla-
tions between type 1 and type 2 shocks of EMU countries and Germany as well as
between CEEC and aggregate EMU. Germany has been chosen as reference since
it is generally seen as the economic core country within EMU. Before determining
the coeﬃcients, the shock time series were smoothened by calculating 3 month
MA. We consider this approach to be advantageous since it avoids a negative
assessment of countries that are hit by the same shocks with a low number of
lags. Furthermore, if a country is hit by a shock asymmetrically with regard to
the core country but this shock is compensated by a reverse one in the succeeding
month, this would not worsen currency union suitability. Still, the analysis of
unsmoothened data would weigh this asymmetry higher than its impact is.
In the following, we concentrate on type 1 shocks. Integration into a single cur-
rency area enhances supranational economic policy coordination, especially by
implementation of a single central bank. Thus, an ex-post analysis of type 2
shocks might underestimate currency union suitability. Country speciﬁc demand
side shocks due to asymmetric national monetary policy cannot occur any more
(Eichengreen, 1993, p. 1333). For the type 1 shocks aﬀecting output in the long
run, based upon production structures, this eﬀect is less important. The coun-
trywise product mix will presumably also be inﬂuenced by monetary union but
this process can be supposed to take much more time than demand-side changes
(Eichengreen, 1993, p. 1333).
Figures 5 and 6 show the estimated correlations of the respective country speciﬁc
shocks with the innovations of the core country in the analysed sample. The fur-
ther a country is located in the northeast of the graph, the higher are the shock
correlations and the better is currency union suitability according to the shock
criterion.
For the present EMU we ﬁnd in accordance to many other related studies on
Western Europe26 a classiﬁcation into a core zone consisting of Germany, Bel-
gium, France, the Netherlands and Austria and a periphery comprising the resid-
ual countries. In comparison with the West, the correlations of the CEEC with
EMU are not of equal size but almost all of the estimated correlations are positive.
Amongst the countries whose accession would cause relatively low costs (accord-
ing to the shock criterion) are Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Slovenia.
If weighing type 1 shocks higher, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic appear to be relatively good candidates.
26E.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Chamie, Deserres and Lalonde (1994), Bayoumi


































Figure 6: Shock correlations CEEC vs. EMU
20Speciﬁcation Coeﬃcients t-Statistic R2
adj
N = 9 ¯0 = -0.098395 -0.519299
(incl. BGR) ¯1 = 0.015030 2.319587 0.353822
N = 8 ¯0 = -0.189558 -1.067499
(excl. BGR) ¯1 = 0.017196 2.903418 0.514894
Table 2: Regression 1-correlation on export
3.5 Interpretation
With regard to the type 1 correlations especially the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Hungary and the Slovak Republic get an advantageous ranking, thus mirroring -
with the exception of Bulgaria - the geographic position of those countries. Im-
mediate EMU neighbours exhibit higher type 1 correlations than other countries,
presumably due to higher trade intensity (ﬁgure 7, see also Winschel, 2001, p.
12 and Gulde et al., 2000, p. 24). A recent evidence for a statistically signiﬁcant
negative interrelation between distance and trade intensity (also known as grav-
ity eﬀect) is provided by Rose (1999, p. 13). Approximately, the assumption of
an interrelation between trade and shock correlation can be tested using a simple
linear regression (cross section data for all 9 countries in 1998) of the following
form:
Cor1 = ¯0 + ¯1Export + u: (12)
Trade intensity, approximated by export27 as percentage of GDP, has a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on type 1 correlation (see table 2). This result
becomes more obvious when eliminating the outlier Bulgaria with regard to the
low data quantity being available for this country. Thus we ﬁnd some evidence
for the McKinnon (1963) openness criterion.
Furthermore, the gravity hypothesis may be tested in a very simple way by the
following regression:
Export = ¯0 + ¯1D + u (13)
with the dummy variable
Di =
(
1 : country i borders to EMU
0 : else.
The result of this rough estimation (see table 3) supports the view that there
exists the intuitively assumed interrelation between trade intensity and neigh-
bourhood. Trade is higher with neighbouring economies. Thus, there is some
27Export ratio proved to be the most explanatory variable in comparison with import and
the arithmetic mean of import and export ratio.
21Coeﬃcients t-Statistic R2
adj
¯0 = 21.17250 5.845315
¯1 = 12.10150 2.490226 0.393996



















Figure 7: CEEC 1998: Trade with EU as % of GDP
Data source: European Parliament (1999, p. 52), IFS, own calculations
¤ January - September
evidence that output relevant shock correlation might be inﬂuenced by trade
intensity and trade intensity itself by distance.
3.6 Dynamic behaviour after a shock
Based upon the inﬁnite MA representations of the estimated VARs one can calcu-
late the impulse response functions of the respective processes. Those functions
represent the answer of price changes and production changes c.p. to a type 1
or type 2 shock. One should notice that the power of the impulse responses for
determining OCAs may be reduced since it is not likely that they would remain
unchanged after monetary uniﬁcation. Still, they can give important information
in how far the ex-post identiﬁed shocks may really be denominated as supply and
demand innovations.
The impulse responses of Germany, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Aus-
22tria, Romania and aggregate EMU show the expected shape. Here the economies
react with persistently higher output growth and reduced inﬂation to shock type
1. Type 2 shocks cause short run ﬂuctuations in output and persistent inﬂation
acceleration. So for those countries we can name shock 1 and 2 supply respec-
tively demand innovations. For illustration, the left hand panel of ﬁgure 8 shows
the estimated impulse response functions of France.
Concerning the other economies (cf. the right hand panel of ﬁgure 8 for the
impulse response functions of Finland), the resulting picture is insofar consistent
as shock 1 pushes the country to a higher growth path and shock 2 accelerates
inﬂation persistently while causing output ﬂuctuations in the short run. The
inﬂuence of type 1 shocks on prices is not always in line with the AS-AD model.
Sometimes, the economies react with enhanced inﬂation to type 1 shocks.
The force of expression of the correlation analysis is nevertheless not reduced.
Type 1 as well as type 2 shocks should exhibit a regionally synchronous devel-
opment in an OCA. If shock 2 hits all of the economies contemporaneously, the
inﬂation rate will grow everywhere. Thus, a common monetary policy should be
suitable for all of the countries. Shock 1 causes higher productivity growth, while
its impact on inﬂation is regionally diverse. Still, the estimated price responses
may have been inﬂuenced by structural breaks in the sample due to discretionary
central bank policies. In the West, the EMU candidates had to meet Maastricht
and in the East the accession candidates exhibited heterogenous monetary and
exchange rate policies as well. Accordingly, we cannot assume that the estimated
MA coeﬃcients will remain stable in the future. The important feature is there-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Year EMU CEEC¤ EMU + CEEC¤
1993 0.553000 0.492000¤¤ 0.519000¤¤
1994 0.529000 0.454000 0.497000
1995 0.500000 0.405000 0.468000
1996 0.470000 0.357000 0.439000
1997 0.448000 0.341000 0.418000
Table 4: Coeﬃcients of variation of national unemployment rates
¤ without Estonia
¤¤ without Slovak Republic
Data source: IFS (own calculations)
3.7 A closer look at labour markets
As mentioned above, an analysis of shock asymmetry should be completed by a
look at labour mobility. Although there does not seem to exist suﬃcient mobility
between East and West (see section 2.3), at least ﬂexibility within the two groups
may be useful as means of adjustment. According to Bini Smaghi and Vori (1993,
p. 15) and Winschel (2001, p. 16), variability of national unemployment rates
at time t may be used as proxy for mobility. Table 4 gives a survey of the
development of the respective coeﬃcients of variation over time. Relatively high
values represent strong divergencies in national rates and point to low mobility
and missing wage ﬂexibility. All three series exhibit a negative trend, showing
that variation declined in time. Additionally, the CEEC coeﬃcients were, in
comparison with EMU, lower. But still, the dispersion has been considerably
higher than in e.g. the US (Winschel, 2001, p. 36, quotes a value of 0:21 for
the USA in 1998). Thus, the assumption that labour is insuﬃciently mobile in
Europe in order to correct for shock imbalances seems to be supported. This
result enforces the importance of the shock analysis.
3.8 Shock convergence in the West
In order to study the impact of the ongoing currency integration on shock cor-
relations we apply the SVAR method to Western European data in the sample
1996:1 to 2001:3.28 In comparison with the results for the ﬁrst half of the 90ies,
there has been an evident concentration of the countries within a small bounded
area in the coordinate plane. Figure 9 shows the changes in the estimated shock
correlations within EMU between the samples 1990:1 to 1995:12 and 1996:1 to
2001:3. The position of the respective economies in the second period is marked
by a dot while the shift is symbolised by a line. Evidently, the peripheral coun-


















Figure 9: Changes in shock correlations: Western Europe
tries Finland, Greece, Italy and Portugal improved their position substantially.
France was lower correlated with Germany with regard to type 1 shocks, but
higher considering type 2 shocks. The only exception is Austria, exhibiting a
strong reduction in both correlations with Germany. This observation may not
be directly explainable by fundamentals.
Still, this short glance at convergence should be interpreted with caution as ECB’s
establishment in 1999 represented a structural break in the middle of the sample.
A VAR estimation assuming a process stable in time could therefore be prob-
lematic. For a detailed shock convergence analysis we suggest to employ data
not before January 1999. Unfortunately, there are so far only few observations so
that the resulting estimations are not supposed to be reliable. Especially seasonal
adjustment should be newly calculated (which is not advisable with data of just
3 complete years). As long as there are suﬃciently long time series this approach
might be used for assessing convergence behaviour after monetary uniﬁcation.
Still, it becomes obvious that the impact of changing structures on shock corre-
lations can supposed to be high enough not to be ignored like all quoted studies
on the CEEC did so far.
254 Conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed EMU suitability of the CEEC using a shock
asymmetry analysis approach. Employing a structural VAR model, we identiﬁed
economic shocks that hit the economies and evaluated their correlations.
The major contributions of the present paper are the choice of the reference area
and the analysed sample. Present EMU, being itself in the state of transition
in the observed period, is an adequate measure for comparison. Usage of data
taken from long-existing currency unions such as the USA cannot be telling in
the present context due to OCA criteria endogeneities. The sample choice largely
turns out the eﬀects of diﬀering starting points on the way to currency uniﬁca-
tion. Again, the results from the convergence analysis in section 3.8 make clear
that this aspect should not be ignored when studying shock correlations.
Although the scatter plot of the CEEC in the shock-1-shock-2 correlation dia-
gram is concentrated more closely to the point of origin than those of EMU, from
today’s point of view one cannot judge the CEECs as worse accession candidates
than present EMU members with regard to the aspect analysed in this paper.
Concerning type 1 shocks, all CEECs except for Romania, are at least as closely
correlated with EMU as Finland, Greece, Italy and Portugal with Germany six
years ago. If correlation within present EMU is used as benchmark, there may
just be doubts on Romania’s EMU suitability. Still, this country does not belong
to the ﬁrst wave group so that its accession is not to be expected in the short
run. If type 2 shocks are taken into consideration additionally, there emerges a
clear picture: Western Europe exhibited in the ﬁrst half of the 90ies a classiﬁ-
cation into the core countries Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Austria (plus the also quite high correlated Spain) and the remaining (periph-
ery) countries. In the second half of the 90ies the CEEC did not prove to be as
strictly categorised. Correlations with EMU were partly lower than those of EMU
countries vs. Germany in the years before. Most strongly correlated concerning
both shock types with EMU in the sample analysed was Hungary; the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic were especially with regard to the
long-run-relevant type 1 shocks correlated with EMU. From the results above one
cannot deduce that the CEEC are systematically less suitable for EMU than its
present members. The results of the convergence analysis point to endogeneity
of the analysed criterion. Again, this may be taken as positive aspect concerning
assessment of OCA suitability of the CEEC. All in all, the ﬁndings for the CEEC
derived in the present paper are more positive than e.g. in Frenkel, Nickel and
Schmidt (1999) or Winschel (2001).
Future shock correlation research should also correct for the impact of changing
structures by using lagged samples in the reference zone. When enough data are
disposable, the SVAR method employed in this paper could also be used - similar
to the Bayoumi and Taylor (1992) approach - to assess structural convergence of
possible accession candidates.
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